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Introduction 
What determines whether people will protect themselves against the 
severe losses that might arise from some rare hazard? 
What factors underlie the perception and acceptability of risks from 
technology? 
The answers to questions such as these are vital for understanding 
how people cope with threats from accidents, diseases, and natural 
hazards and for helping them manage their lives more effectively in the 
face of such risks. The role that the study of judgment and decision 
processes can play in providing answers to these questions will be 
explored in this paper. Experiments studying insurance decisions, risk 
perception, and evaluation of technological risks will be described 
along with implications of this research for matters of public safety 
and health. 
Overview 
This paper is divided into five sections. It begins with a brief 
des·cription of the leading normative theory of protective decision 
making, which proposes that a rational decision maker acts so as to 
maximize expected utility. The second section contrasts this idealized 
view with research on human intellectual limitations showing that people 
are, at best, "boundedly rational." In this section, we focus on the 
problems that occur when people seek to make sense out of a proba-
bilistic environment and attempt· .to resolve the value conflii;:ts arising 
from decisions about beneficial but hazardous activities. We point out 
the difficulties people have in thinking intuitively about risk and 
uncertainty. We argue that people's perceptions of the world are 
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sometimes distorted and that their preferences can be unstable, vague, 
or inconsistent. The results of this research run counter to the 
traditional presumptions of knowledge and rationality that underlie 
economic approaches to decision making under risk. 
The third section of this paper shows how some of the findings of 
the first section can be applied to two specific policy problems dealing 
with protective behavior: purchasing flood insurance and wearing seat 
belts. We argue that, to be effective, policies need to be based on 
knowledge regarding the determinants of people's protective behavior. 
Empirical research can play an important role in providing such 
knowledge. 
The fourth section describes research on the perception of risk. 
This research explores what people mean when they say that an activity 
or a technology is "risky". We find that many attributes other than 
death rates determine judgments of riskiness. Such attributes include 
catastrophic potential, risk to future generations, and dread~ In 
contrast with the first section, the tone of this section is optimistic. 
We find that laypeople have strong, consistent and reasonable views 
about risk. In fact, their model of what constitutes risk appears to be 
much richer than that held by most technical experts. 
The final section is a discussion of the problems encountered in 
trying to inform people about risk. A common reaction of industry and 
government officials to evidence of ignorance, misinformation, or faulty 
thinking has been to call for educational programs to correct these 
shortcomings. Although we applaud such efforts and do believe that 
I 
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people are educable, our emphasis is on the obstacles educational 
programs must overcome in order to be effective. 
A RATIONAL MODEL FOR PROTECTIVE DECISIONS 
Decision theory provides a model, based on the maximization of 
expected utility, that serves as a normative or "rational" basis for 
protective decisions. Lt is rational in the sense of trying to 
prescribe a course of action that is consistent with the decision 
maker's own goals, expectations, and values. 
In this model, decisions in the face of risk are typically 
represented by a payoff matrix, in which the rows correspond to 
alternative acts that the decision maker can select and the columns 
correspond to possible states of nature. In the cells of the payoff 
matrix are a set of consequences contingent upon the joint occurrence of 
a decision and a state of nature. A simple illustration for a traveler 
is given in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 about here 
·Since it is impossible to make a decision that will turn out best in 
any eventuality, decision theorists view choice alternatives as gambles 
and try to choose according to the "b~st bet." In 1738, Bernouli 
defined the notion of best bet as one that maximizes the quantity 
n 
EU(A) ='.).. P(Ei) U(Xi) 
i=l 
where EU(A) represents the expected utility of a course of action which 
has consequences x1 , x2 , ••• , Xn depending on events E1, E2 ••• , 
\ 
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En' ,P(Ei) represents the probability of the .!_th outcome of that action 
and U(X.) represents the subjective value or utility of that outcome. 
1 
If we assume that the parenthesized values in the cells of Table 1 
represent the traveler's utilities for the various consequences, and if 
the probability of sun and rain are taken to be 0.6 and 0.4, 
respectively, we can compute the expected utility for each action as 
follows: 
EU(A1) = 0.6(+1) + 0.4(+1) = 1.0 
EU(A2) = 0.6(+2) + 0.4(0) = 1.2 
In this situation, leaving the umbrella has greater expected utility 
than taking it along. The same form of analysis can be applied to 
computing the expected utility of heeding a flood warning, getting 
vaccinated against the flu, or buying insurance. 
A major advance in decision theory came when von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1947) developed a formal justification for the expected 
utility criterion. They showed that, if an individual's preferences 
satisfied certain basic axioms of rational. behavior, then his or her 
decisions could be described as the maximization of expected utility. 
Savage (1954) later generalized the theory to allow the P(E1 ) values to 
represent subjective or personal probabilities. 
Maximization of expected utility commands respect as a guideline for 
wise behavior because it can be deduced from axiomatic principles that 
presumably would be accepted by any rational person. One such 
principle, that of transitivity, asserts that, if a decision maker 
prefers outcome A to outcome B and outcome B. to outcome C, then he or 
she should prefer outcome A to outcome C. Any individuals who are 
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deliberately and systematically intransitive can be turned into "money 
pumps. You can say to them: "I'll give you C. Now, for a penny, I'll 
take back C and give you B." Sine~ they prefer B to C, they accept. 
Next you offer to replace B with A for another penny and again they 
accept. The cycle is completed by offering to replace A by C for 
another penny; the person accepts and is 3 cents poorer, back where they 
started, and ready for another round. 
A second important tenet of rationality, known as the extended 
sure-thing principle, states that, if an outcome Xi is the same for two 
risky actions, then the value of X. should be disregarded in choosing 
1 
between the two options. Another way to state this principle is that 
outcomes that are not affected by your choice should not influence your 
decision. 
These two principles, combined with several others of technical 
importance, imply a rather powerful conclusion--namely that the wise 
decision maker chooses that act whose expected utility is greatest. To 
do otherwise would violate one or more basic tenets of rationality. 
Applied decision theory assumes that the rational decision maker 
wishes to select an action that is logically consistent with his basic 
preferences for outcomes and his feelings about the likelihoods of the 
events upon which those outcomes depend. Given this assumption, the 
practical problem becomes one of listing the alternatives and scaling 
the subjective values of outcomes and their likelihoods so that 
subjective expected utility can be calculated for each alternative. 
Another problem in application arises from the fact that the range of 
theoretically possible alternatives is often quite large. In addition 
=== 
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to carrying an umbrella, the risk-taking traveler in our earlier example 
may have the options of carrying a raincoat, getting a ride, waiting for 
the rain to stop, and many others. Likewise, the outcomes are 
considerably more complex than in our simple example. For example, the 
consequences of building a dam are multiple, involving effects on flood 
potential, hydroelectric power, recreation, and local ecology. Some 
specific approaches that have been developed for dealing with the 
additional complexities of any real decision situation are discussed in 
the decision theory literature (see, e.g., Keeney & Raiffa, 1976). 
CONFRONTING HUMAN LIMITATIONS 
Bounded Rationality 
The traditional view of human mental processes assumes that we are 
intellectually gifted creatures. Shakespeare referred to humans as 
"noble in reason, infinite in faculties ••• the beauty of the world, the 
-
paragon of animals." The rational model described above, with its 
presumption of well informed, utility maximizing decision makers, has 
echoed this theme. As economist Frank Knight put it, "We are so built 
\ 
that what seems reasonable to us is likely to be confirmed by experience 
or we could not live in the world at all" (1921, p. 227). 
An important early critic of the economic model's descriptive 
adequacy was Herbert Simon, who drew upon psychological research to 
challenge traditional assumptions about the motivation, omniscience, and 
computational capacities of decision makers. As an alternative to 
utility maximization, Simon (1957) introduced the notion of "bounded 
rationality," which asserts that cognitive limitations force people to 
construct simplified models of the world in order to 'cope with it. To 
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predict behavior ..... we must understand the way in which this.simplified 
model is constructed, and its construction will certainly be related to 
'man's' psychological properties as a perceiving, thinking, and learning 
animal" (p. 198). 
During the past twenty years, the skeleton theory of bounded 
rationality has been fleshed out. We have learned much about human 
cognitive limitations and their implications for behavior--particularly 
with regard to decisions made in the face of uncertainty and risk. 
Numerous studies show that people (including experts) have great 
difficulty judging probabilities, making predictions, and otherwise 
attempting to cope with uncertainty. Frequently these difficulties can 
be traced to the use of judgmental heuristics, which serve as general 
strategies for simplifying complex tasks. These heuristics are valid in 
many circumstances, but in others they lead to large and persistent 
biases with serious implications for decision making. Much of this work 
has been summarized by Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (1982), Nisbett and 
Ross (1980), Slavic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein (1977), and Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974). In the remainder of this section we shall discuss two 
general manifestations of bounded rationality that are particularly 
relevant to regulation of risk. These topics are judgmental biases and 
unstable preferences. 
Judgmental Biases in Risk Perception 
If people are to respond optimally to:the risks they face, they must 
have reasonably accurate perceptions of the magnitude of those risks. 
Yet the formal education of most laypeople rarely includes any serious 
( 
instruction in how to assess risks. Their subsequent learning is 
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typically restricted to unsystematic personal experience and news media 
reports. It should not be surprising that people dften are misinformed, 
rely on suboptimal risk assessment strategies, and fail to understand 
the limits of their own knowledge. 
Availability. One inferential strategy that has special relevance 
for risk perception is the availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973). People using this heuristic judge an event as likely or frequent 
• 
if instances of it are easy to imagine or recall. Because frequently 
occurring events are generally easier to imagine or recall than are rare 
events, availability is often an appropriate cue. However, availability 
is also affected by factois unrelated to frequency of o·ccurrence. For 
example, a recent disaster or a vivid film could seriously bias risk 
judgments. 
Availability bias is illustrated by several studies in which people 
judged the frequency of 41 causes of death (Lichtenstein, Slovic, 
Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978J. In one study, these people were 
first told the annual death toll in the United States for one cause 
(50,000 deaths from motor vehicles accidents) and then asked to estimate 
the frequency of the other 40 causes. Figure 1 compares the judged 
number of deaths per year with the number reported in public health 
statistics. If the frequency judgments equalled the statistical rates, 
all data points would fall on the identity line. Although more likely 
hazards generally evoked higher estimates, the points were scattered 
about a curved line that lay sometimes above and sometimes below the 
line representing accurate judgment. In general, rare causes of death 
were overestimated and common causes of death were underestimated. In 
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addition to this general bias·, sizable specific biases are evident in 
Figure 1. For example, accidents were judged to cause as many deaths as 
diseases, whereas diseases actually take about 15 times as many lives. 
Homicides were incorrectly judged as more frequent than diabetes and 
stomach cancer deaths. Pregnancies, births, and abortions were judged 
to take about as many lives as diabetes, though diabetes actually causes 
about 80 times more deaths. In keeping with availability 
considerations, causes of death that were overestimated (relative to the 
curved line) tended to be dramatic and sensational (accidents, natural 
disasters, fires, homicides), whereas underestimated causes tended to be 
unspectacular events that claim one victim at a time and are common in 
nonfatal form (e.g., smallpox vaccinations, stroke, diabetes, 
emphysema). 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
The availability heuristic highlights the vital role of experience 
as a determinant of perceived risk. If one's experiences are 
misleading, one's perceptions are likely to be inaccurate. 
Unfortunately, much of the information to which people are exposed 
provides a distorted picture of the world of hazards. One result of 
this is that people tend to view themselves as personally immune to 
certain kinds of hazards. Research shows that the great majority of 
individuals believe themselves to be better than average drivers 
(Svenson, 1981), more likely than average to live past 80 years old 
(Weinstein, 1980), less likely than average to be harmed by products 
page 10 
that they use (Rethans, 1979), and so on. Although such perceptions are 
obviously unrealistic, the risks may look very small from the · · 
perspective of each individual's experience. Consider automobile 
driving: despite driving too fast, following too closely, etc., poor 
drivers make trip after trip without mishap. This personal experience 
demonstrates to them their exceptional skill and safety. Moreover, 
their indirect experi~nce via the news media shows that when accidents 
happen, they happen to others. Given such misleading experiences, 
people may feel quite justified in refusing to take protective actions 
such as wearing seat belts (Slavic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1978). 
In some situations, failure to appreciate the limits of available 
data may lull people into complacency. For example, we asked people to 
evaluate the completeness of a fault tree showing the problems that 
could cause a car not to start when the ignition key was turned 
(Fischhoff, Slavic, & Lichtenstein, 1978). Respondents' judgments of 
completeness were about the same when looking at the full tree as when 
looking at a tree in which half of the causes of starting failure were 
deleted. In keeping with the availability heuristic, what was out of 
sight was also out of mind. The only antidote to availability-induced 
biases is to recognize the limitations in the samples of information 
received from the world and produced by one's own mind. Doing so 
requires a knowledge of the world and of mental processes that few 
people can be expected to have. Even,scientists often have difficulty 
identifying systematic biases in their data. 
Overconfidence. A particularly pernicious aspect of heuristics is 
that people typically have too much confidence in judgments based upon 
--·-·" 
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them. In another follow-up to the study on causes of death, people were 
asked to indicate the odds that they were correct in choosing the more 
frequent of two lethal events (Fischhoff, Slovic, & Lichtenstein, 1977). 
Odds of 100 1 or greater were given often (25% of the time). However, 
about one out of every eight answers associated with such extreme 
confidence was wrong (fewer than 1 in 100 would have been wrong had the 
odds been appropriate). At odds of 10,000 : 1, people were wrong about 
10% of the time. The psychological basis for this unwarranted certainty 
seems to be an insensitivity to the tenuousness of the assumptions upon 
which one's judgments are based. For example, extreme confidence in the 
incorrect assertion that homicides are more frequent than suicides may 
occur because people fail to appreciate that the greater ease of 
recalling instances of homicides is an imperfect basis for inference. 
Overconfidence manifests itself in other ways as well. A typical 
task in estimating uncertain quantities such as failure rates is to set 
upper and lower,bounds so that there is a certain fixed probability that 
the true value lies between them. Experiments with diverse groups of 
people making many different kinds of judgments have found that true 
values tend to lie outside of the confidence boundaries much too often. 
Results with 98% bounds are typical. Rather than 2% of the true values 
falling outside such bounds, 20-50% usually do so (Lichtenstein, 
Fischhoff & Phillips, 1982). Thus people think that they can estimate 
uncertain quantities with much greater precision than they actually can. 
Unfortunately, once experts are forced to go beyon~ their data and 
rely on judgment, they may be as prone to overconfidence as laypeople. 
Fischhoff, Slovic, and Lichtenstein (1978) repeated their fault-tree 
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study with professional automobile mechanics (averaging about 15 years 
of experience) and found them to be about as insensitive as laypersons 
, 
to deletions from the tree.· Hynes and Vanmarcke (1976) asked seven 
"internationally known" geotechnical engineers to predict the height of 
an embankment that would cause a clay foundation to fail and to specify 
confidence bounds around this estimate that were wide enough to have a 
50% chance of enclosing the true failure height. None of the bounds 
specified by those individuals actually enclosed the true failure 
height. 
Unstable Preferences: Difficulties in Evaluating Risk 
The process of evaluation is the heart of decision making. 
Evaluating the (good and bad) outcomes associated with hazardous 
activities might seem to be relatively straightforward. Certainly 
people know what they like and dislike. Research has, however, shown 
the assessment of values to be as troublesome as the assessment of 
facts. Evidence is mounting in support of the view that our values are 
often not clearly apparent, even to ourselves; that methods for 
measuring values are intrusive and biased; and that the structure of any 
decision problem is p~ychologically unstable, leading to inconsistencies 
in choice. 
Labile values! When one is considering simple, familiar events with 
which people have direct experience, it may be reasonable to assume that 
they have well-articulated preferences. But that may not be so in the 
case of the novel, unfamiliar consequences potentially associated with 
I I 
outcomes of events such as surgery, automobile accidents, 
carbon-dioxide-induced climatic changes, nuclear meltdowns, or genetic 
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engineering. In these and other circumstances, our values may be 
incoherent, not sufficiently thought out (Fischhoff, Slovic & 
Lichtenstein, 1980a, b). When we think about risk management policies, 
for example, we may be unfamiliar with the terms involved (e.g., social 
discount rates, minuscule probabilities, megadeaths). We may have 
contradictory values (e.g., a strong aversion. to catastrophic losses of 
life but an awareness that we are no more moved by a plane crash with 
500 fatalities than one with 300). We may occupy different roles in 
life (parents, workers, children) each of which produces clear-cut but 
inconsistent values. We may vacillate between incompatible but strongly 
held positions (e.g., freedom of speech is inviolate, but it should be 
denied authoritarian movements). We may not even know how .to begin 
thinking about some issues (e.g., the appro_priate tradeoffs between the 
outcomes of surgery for cancer vs. the very different outcomes from 
radiation therapy). Our views may charl;ge so much over time (say, as we 
near the hour of decision or of experiencing the consequences) that we 
are disoriented ~s to what we really think. 
Competent decision analysts may tell us what primary, secondary, and 
tertiary consequences to expect, but not what these consequences really 
entail. To some extent we are all prisoners of our past experiences, 
unable to imagine drastic changes in our world or health or 
relationships. 
Unstable decision frames. In addition to the uncertainties that 
sometimes surround our values, perceptions of the basic structure of a 
decision problem are also unstable. The acts or options available, the 
possible outcomes or consequences of those acts, and the contingencies 
er---------·----, - ,___ ' 
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or conditional probabilities relating outcomes to acts make up what 
Tversky and Kahneman ( 1981) have called the "decision frame." Much as 
changes in vantage point induce alternative perspectives on a visual 
scene, the same decision problem can be subject to many alternative 
frames (see Figure 2). Which frame is adopted is determined ·in part by 
the external formulation of the problem and in part by the structure 
spontaneously imposed by the decision maker. Tversky and Kahneman have 
demonstrated .that-normatively inconsequential changes in the framing of 
decision problems significantly affect preferences. These effects are 
noteworthy because they are sizable (often complete reversals of · 
preference), because th~y violate important consistency and coherence 
requirements of economic the~ries of choice, and because they influence 
not only behavior, but how the consequences of behavior are experienced. 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) have presented numerousjillustrations of 
framing effects, one of which involves the following pair of problems, 
given to separate groups of respondents. 
1. Problem· 1. Imagine th~t the U.S. is preparing for the 
outbreak of an unusual disease, which is expected to kill 600 
people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been 
proposed. Assume that the consequences of the programs are as 
follows: If Program A is adopted, 200 people will ·be saved. If 
Program Bis adopted, there is 1/3 probability that 600 people will 
be saved, and 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. Which 
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of the two programs would you favor? 
2. Problem 2. (Same cover story as Problem 1.) If Program C 
is adopted, 400people will die. If Program Dis adopted, there is 
1/3 probability that nobody will die, and 2/3 probability that 600 
people will die. Which of the two programs would you favor? 
The preference patterns tend to be quite different in the two 
problems. In a study of-college students, 72% of the respondents chose 
Program A over Program Band 78% chose Program Dover Program C. 
Another study, surveying physicians, obtained very similar results. On 
closer examination, we can see that the two problems are essentially 
identical. The only difference between them is that the outcomes are 
described by the numb.er of lives saved in Problem 1 and the number of 
lives lost in Problem 2. 
One important class of framing effects deals with a phenomenon that 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) have called "pseudocertainty." It involves 
altering the representations of protective actions so as to vary the 
·apparent certainty with which they prevent harm. For example, an 
insurance policy that covers fire but not flood could be presented 
either as full protection against the specific risk of fire or as a 
reduction in the overall probability of property loss. Because outcomes 
that are merely probable are undervalued in comparison with outcomes 
that are obtained with certainty, Tversky and Kahneman hypothesized that 
the above insurance policy should appear more attractive. in the first 
context (pseudocertainty), which offers unconditional protection against 
a restricted set of. problems. We have tested this conjecture in the 
context of one particular kind of protection, vaccination. Two forms of 
page 16 
a "vaccination questionnaire" were created. Form I (probabilistic 
protection) described a disease expected to afflict 20% of the 
population and asked people whether they would volunteer to receive a 
vaccine that protects half of the people receiving it. According to 
Form II (pseudocertainty), there were two mutually exclusive and 
equiprobable strains of the disease, each likely to afflict 10% of the 
population; the vaccination was said to give complete protection against 
one strain and no protection against the other. 
The participants in this study were college students, half of whom 
received each form. After reading the description, they rated the 
likelihood that they would get vaccinated in such a situation. Although 
both forms indicated that vaccination reduced one's overall risk from 
20% to 10%, we expected that vaccination would appear more attractive to 
those who received Form II (pseudocertainty) than to those who received 
Form I (probabilistic protection). The results confirmed this 
prediction: 57% of those who received Form II indicated they would get 
vaccinated compared with 40% of those who received Form I. 
The pseudocertainty effect highlights the contrast between the 
reduction and the elimination of risk. As Tversky and Kahneman have 
indicated, this distinction is difficult to justify on any normative 
grounds. Moreover, manipulations of certainty would seem to have 
important implications for the design and description of other forms of 
protection (e.g., medical treatments, insurance, flood- and earthquake-
proofing activities). 
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STUDIES OF PROTECTIVE BEHAVIOR 
In this section we shall describe studies of two kinds of protective 
behav"ior, insurance purchases and the use of seat belts. This research, 
which was designed to provide basic knowledge relevant for regulatory 
decisions, illustrates the complex interplay between cognitive 
limitatins and public policy. 
National Flood Insurance Program 
Although few residents of flood and earthquake areas voluntarily 
insure themselves against the consequences of such disasters, many turn 
to the federal government for aid after suffering losses. Policy makers 
have argued that both the government and the property owners at risk 
would be better off financially under a federal insurance program. Such. 
a program would shift the burden of disasters from the general taxpayer 
to individuals living in hazardous areas and would thus promote wiser 
decisions regarding the use of flood plains (Kunreuther et al., 1978). 
Without a firm understanding of how people perceive and react to 
risks, however, there is no way of knowing what sort of disaster 
insurance program would be most effective. For example, the National 
Flood Insurance Program took the seemingly reasonable step of lowering 
the cost of insurance in order to stimulate purchases. However, despite 
heavily subsidized rates, relatively few policies were bought 
(Kunreuther, 1974). 
An integrated program of laboratory experiments and field surveys by 
Kunreuther, Ginsberg, Miller, Sagi, Slovic, Borkan, & Katz (1978) and 
Slovic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Corrigan, & Combs (1977) was designed 
to determine the critical factors influencing the voluntary purchase of 
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insurance against natural hazards such as floods or earthquakes. 
Analysis of the survey data revealed widespread ignorance and 
misinformation regarding the availability and terms of insurance and the 
probabilities of damage from a future disaster. The laboratory 
experiments showed that people preferred to insure against relatively 
high-probability, low-loss hazards and tended to reject insurance in 
situations where the probability of loss was low and the potential 
losses were high. These results suggest that people's natural 
predispositions run counter to economic theory (e.g., Friedman & Savage, 
1948), which assumes that individuals are risk averse and should desire 
a mechanism that protects them from rare catastrophic losses. 
When asked about their insurance decisions, subjects in both the 
laboratory and survey studies indicated a disinclination to worry about 
low-probability hazards. Such a strategy is understandable. Given the 
limitations on their time, energy, and attentional capacities, people 
have a finite reservoir of concern. Unless they ignored many 
low-probability threats they would become so burdened that productive 
life would become impossible. Another insight gleaned from the 
experiments and the survey is that people think of insurance as an 
investment. Receiving payments for claims seems to be viewed as a 
return on the premium--one which is received more often with more 
probable losses. The popularity of low-deductible insurance plans 
(Fuchs, 1976; Pashigian, Schkade & Menefee, 1966) provides confirmation 
from outside the laboratory that people prefer to insure against 
relatively probable events with small consequences. 
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One surprising survey result was that homeowners' lack of interest 
in disaster insurance did not seem to be due to expectations that the 
federal government would bail them out in an emergency. The majority of 
individuals interviewed said they anticipated no aid at all from the 
government in the event of a disaster. Most appeared not to have 
considered how they would recover from flood or earthquake damage. 
If insurance is to be marketed on a voluntary basis, consumers' 
attitudes and information-processing limitations must be taken into 
account. Policy makers and insurance providers must find ways to 
communicate the risks and arouse concern for the hazards. One method 
found to work in the laboratory experiments is to increase the perceived 
probability of disaster by lengthening the individual's time horizon. 
For example, considering the risk of experiencing a 100-year flood at 
least once during a 25-year p·eriod, instead of considering the risk in 
one year, raises the pr.obability from .01 to .22 and may thus cast flood 
insurance in a more favorable light. Another step would have insurance 
agents play an active role in educating homeowners about the proper use 
of insurance as a protective mechanism and providing information about 
the availability of insurance, rate schedules, deductible values, etc. 
If such actions are not effective, then it may be necessary to institute 
some form of mandatory coverage. Recognizing the difficulty of inducing 
voluntary coverage, the National Flood Insurance Program now requires 
insurance as a condition for obtaining federal funds for building in 
flood-prone areas. 
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Seat Belts 
Another form of protection that people do not often use is the auto-
mobile seat belt. Promotional efforts to get motorists to wear seat 
belts have failed dismally (Robertson, 1976). Despite expensive 
advertising campaigns and buzzer systems, fewer than 20% of motorists 
"buckle up for safety." Policy makers have criticized the public for 
failing to appreciate the risks of driving and the benefits of seat 
belts. However, results from risk perception research provide an 
alternative perspective that seems at once more respectful of drivers' 
reasoning and more likely to increase. seat belt use. 
As noted above, people's insurance decisions reflect a 
disinclination to worry about very small probabilities. Reluctance to· 
wear seat belts might, therefore, be due to the extremely small 
probability of incurring a fatal accident on a. single automobile trip. 
Because a fatal accident occurs only about once in every 3.5 million 
person-trips and a disabling injury.only once in about every 100,000 
person-trips, refusing to buckle up one's seat belt may seem quite 
reasonable. It may' look less reasonable, however, if one frames the 
problem within a multiple-trip perspective. This is, of course, the 
perspective of traffic safety planners, who see the thousands of lives 
that might be saved annually if belts were used regularly. For the 
individual, during 50 years of auto travel (about 40,000 trips), the 
probability of being killed is .01 and the probability of experiencing 
at least one disabling injury is .33. In laboratory experiments, we 
found that people induced to consider this lifetime perspective 
responded more favorably toward the use of seat belts (and air bags) 
page 21 
than did people asked to consider a trip-by-trip perspective (Slovic, 
Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1978). More recent studies suggest that 
television and radio messages based on this lifetime-cumulative-risk 
theme can increase actual seat belt use (Schwalm & Slavic, 1982). 
UNDERSTANDING PERCEIVED RISK 
If it is to aid hazard management, a theory of perceived risk must 
explain people's extreme aversion to some hazards, their indifference to 
others, and the discrepancies between these reactions and experts' 
recommendations. Why, for example, do some people react vigorously 
against the location of a liquid natural gas terminal in their vicinity, 
despite the assurances of experts that it is safe? Why, on the other 
hand, do people living below great dams generally show little concern 
for experts' warnings? Over the past few years researchers have been 
attempting to answer such questions as these by examining the opinions 
that people express when they are asked, in a variety of ways, to 
characterize and evaluate hazardous activities and technologies. The 
goals of ~his descriptive research are (a) to develop a taxonomy of risk 
characteristics that can be used to understand and predict societal 
responses to hazards and (b) to develop methods for assessing public 
opinions about risk in a way that could be useful for policy decisions. 
The Psychometric Paradigm 
Psychometric scaling methods and multivariate analysis techniques 
have been us~d to produce quantitative representations of risk attitudes 
and perceptions (Brown & Green, 1980; Fischhoff, Slavic, Lichtenstein, 
Layman, & Combs, 1978; Gardner, Tiemann, Gould, DeLuca, Doob, & 
Stolwijk, 1982; Green, 1980a, b; Green & Brown, 1980; Johnson & Tversky, 
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in press; Renn, 1981; Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1979, 1980a, in 
press; Vlek & Stallen, 1981; von Winterfeldt, John & Borcherding, 1982). 
Researchers employing the psychometric paradigm have typically asked 
people to judge the current and desired riskiness (or safety) of diverse 
sets of hazardo~s activities, substances, and technologies, and to 
indicate their desires for risk reduction and regulation of these 
hazards. These global judgments have then been related to judgments 
abcmt: 
- the hazard's status on characteristics that have been hypothesized 
to account for risk perceptions and attitudes (e.g., voluntariness, 
dread, knowledge, controllability), 
- the benefits that each hazard provides to society, 
- the number of deaths caused by the hazard in an average year, 
- the number of deaths caused by the hazard in a disastrous year, 
and 
- the relative seriousness of a death from various causes. 
Among the generalizations that have been drawn from the results of 
psychometric studies are the following: 
1. Perceived risk is quantifiable and predictable. Psychometric 
techniques seem well suited for identifying similarities and differences 
among groups with regard to risk perceptions and attitudes (see, for 
example, Table 2). 
Insert Table 2 about here 
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2. "Risk" means different things to different people. When experts 
judge risk, their responses correlate highly with technical estimates of 
annual fatalities (Figure 3, top). Laypeople can assess annual 
fatalities if they are asked to (and produce ·estimates somewhat similar 
to the technical estimates). However, their judgments of risk are 
sensitive to other factors as well (e.g., ca ta.strophic potential, threat 
to future generations) and, as a result, are not closely related to 
their own (or experts') estimates of annual fatalities (see Figure 3, 
bottom). 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
--------------------------
' 
3. Even when groups disagree about the overall riskiness of 
specific hazards, they show remarkable agreement when rating those 
hazards on charac~eristics of risk such as knowledge, controllability, 
dread, catastrophic potential, etc. 
4. Many of these risk characteristics are highly correlated with 
each other, across a wide domain of hazards. For example, voluntary 
hazards tend also to be controllable and well known, hazards that 
threaten future generations tend also to be seen as having catastrophic 
potential. Analysis of these interrelationships shows that the broader 
domain of characteristics can be condensed to three higher-order 
characteristics or factors. These factors reflect the degree to which a 
risk is understood, the degree to which it evokes a feeling of dread, 
and the number of people.exposed to the risk (see Figure 4). This 
factor structure has been found to be similar across groups of 
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laypersons and experts judging large and diverse sets of hazards. 
Making the set of hazards more specific (e.g., partitioning nuclear 
power into radioactive waste transport, uranium mining, nuclear reactor 
accidents, etc.) appears to have little effect on the factor structure 
or its relationship to risk perceptions (Slovic, Fischhoff & 
Lichtenstein, in press).2 
Insert Figure~ about here 
5. Many of the various characteristics, particularly those 
associated with the factor "Dread Risk," correlate highly with 
laypersons' perceptions of risk. The higher an activity's score on the 
dread factor, ~he higher its perceived risk, the more people want its 
risks reduced, and the more they want to see strict regulation employed 
to achieve the desired reductions in risk (see Figure 5). The factor 
labeled "Unknown Risk" tends not to correlate highly with risk 
perception. Factor 3, Exposure, is moderately related to lay 
perceptions of risk. In contrast, experts' perceptions of risk are not 
related to any of these risk characteristics or factors derived from 
I 
them. As noted above, experts' risk perceptions seem determined by 
annual fatalities. 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
6. The perceived seriousness of an accident is systematically 
related to its "signal potential," the degree to which that accident 
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serves as a warning signal, providing information about the probability 
that similar or more destructive mishaps might occur. Signal potential 
and perceived seriousness are systematically related to both Dread Risk, 
and Unknown Risk factors (see Figure 6). 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
7. In agreement with hypotheses originally put forth by Starr 
( 1969), people's ac.ceptance of risk appears related to their perception 
of benefit. All other things being equal, greater perceived benefit is 
associated with a greater acceptance of risk. Moreover, acceptability 
depends upon various qualitative aspects of risk, including its 
voluntariness, familiarity, catastrophic potential and perceived 
uncertainty. In sharp contrast to Starr's views, however, our 
respondents did not believe that society has managed hazards so well 
that optimal tradeoffs among these characteristics have already been 
achieved. 
Implications of Risk Perception Research 
In the results of the psychometric studies, we have the beginnings 
of a perceptual/psychological classification system for hazards. 
Ultimately, we need not only a better psychological taxonomy but one 
that also reflects physical, biological, and social/managerial elements 
of hazards. Such a taxonomy would be a potent device for understanding 
and guiding social regulation of risk. We are far from this goal, 
though a start towards an expanded taxonomy has been made (Hohenemser, 
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Kates & Slovic, 1983). For the present, more modest insights and 
applications must suffice. 
Forecasting public response. Despite the lack of a complete 
understanding of public attitudes and perceptions, we have attempted to 
use the results from risk perception studies to explain and forecast 
reactions to specific technologies. Nuclear power has been the 
principle object of such analysis because of the obvious role of social 
factors governing this important technology. Weinberg (1976), 
reflecting on the future of nuclear power, observed that, ..... the public 
perception and acceptance of nuclear energy ••• has emerged as the most 
critical question." The reasonableness of these perceptions has been 
the topic of an extensive public debate, filled with charges and 
countercharges. For example, one industry source has argued that public 
reaction to Three Mile Island has cost " ••• as much as $500 billion ••• and 
,is one measure of the price being paid as a consequence of fear arising 
out of an accident that according to the most thorough estimates may not 
have physiologically hurt even one member of the public (EPRI Journal, 
1980; p. 30)." 
Risk perception research offers some promise of clarify~ng the 
concerns of opponents of nuclear power (Fischhoff, Slovic & 
Lichtenstein, 1983; Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1981b; Slovic, 
Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1979). In particular, psychometric studies 
show that these people judge its benefits as quite low and its risks as 
unacceptably great. On the benefit side, most opponents do not see 
nuclear power as a vital link in meeting basic energy needs; rather, 
they view it as a supplement to other sources of energy which are 
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themselves adequate. On the risk side, nuclear power occupies ·a unique 
position in the factor space, reflecting people's views that its risks 
are unknown, dread, uncontrollable, inequitable, catastrophic, and 
likely to affect future generations (see Figure 4). Opponents recognize 
that few people have died to date as a result of nuclear power. 
However, they do have great concern over the potential for catastrophic 
accidents. Nuclear hazards are particularly memorable and imaginable, 
yet hardly amenable to empirical verification. These special qualities 
blur the distinction between the possible and the probable and produce 
an immense gap between the views of most technical experts and a 
significant portion of the public. Because much of the opposition to 
nuclear power can be understood in terms of basic psychological 
principles of perception and cognition or to deep-seated differences in 
values, this opposition is not likely to be reduced by information 
campaigns that focus on safety. What might improve the industry's 
status is convincing information about its benefits, perhaps in 
conjunction with energy shortages. A superb safety record might, over 
time, reduce opposition, but because nuclear risks are perceived to be 
unknown and potentially catastrophic, even small accidents will be 
judged as quite serious (see Figure 6), will be highly publicized, and 
will have immense social costs. This fact has direct implications for 
the setting of safety standards (Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 
1980c). 
This type of research may also forecast the response to technologies 
that have yet to catch the public's eye. For example, our studies 
indicate that recombinant DNA technology shares several of the 
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characteristics that make nuclear power so hard to manage (Slavic, 
Fischhoff & Li~htenstein, in press). If it somehow seizes public 
attention, this new technology could face some of the same problems and 
opposition now confronting the nuclear industry. 
INFORMING PEOPLE ABOUT RISK 
One consequence of the growing concern about hazards has been 
pressure on the promoters and regulators of hazardous enterprises to 
inform citizens, patients, and workers about the risks they face from 
their daily activities, their medical treatments, and their jobs (see 
Cohen's chapter, this book). Attempts to implement information programs 
depend upon a variety of political, economic and legal forces (e.g., 
Gibson, 1985; Sales, 1982). The success of such efforts depends, in 
part, upon how clearly the information can be presented (Fischhoff, 
1985; Slavic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 1980a, 1981). 
One thing that past research demonstrates clearly is the difficulty 
of creating effective risk-information programs. Doing an adequate job 
means finding cogent ways of presenting complex technical material that 
is often clouded by uncertainty. Reactions to the material may be 
distorted by the listeners' preconceptions (and possibly the presenter's 
misrepresentations) of the hazard and its consequences. Difficulties in 
putting risks into perspective or resolving the conflicts posed by 
life's gambles may cause risk information to frighten and frustrate 
people, rather than aid their decision making. 
If an individual has formed strong initial impressions about a 
hazard, results from cognitive social psychology suggest that those 
beliefs may structure the way that subsequent evidence is interpreted. 
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New evidence will appear reliable and informative if it is consistent 
with one's initial belief; contrary evidence may be dismissed as 
unreliable, erroneous, or unrepresentative. As a result, strongly held 
views will be extraordinarily difficult to change by informational 
presentations (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). 
When people lack strong prior opinions about a hazard, the opposite 
situation exists--they are at the mercy of the way that the information 
is presented. Subtle changes in the way that. risks are expressed can 
have a major impact on perceptions and decisions. One dramatic recent 
example of this comes from a study by McNeil, Pauker, Sox, and Tversky 
(1982), who asked people to imagine that they had lung cancer and had to 
choose between two therapies, surgery or radiation. The two therapies 
were described in some detail. Then, some subjects were presented with 
the cumulative probabilities of surviving for varying lengths of time 
after the treatment. Other subjects received the same cumulative 
probabilities framed in terms of dying rather than surviving (e.g., 
instead of being told that 68% of those having surgerY, will have 
survived after one year, they were told that 32% will have died). 
Framing the statistics in terms of dying dropped the percentage of 
subjects choosing radiation therapy over surgery from 44% to 18%. The 
effect was as strong for physicians as for laypersons. 
Numerous other examples of "framing effects" have been demonstrated 
by Tversky and Kahneman (1981). Some of these effects can be explained 
in terms of the nonlinear probability and value functions proposed by 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) in their theory of risky choice. Others can 
be explained in terms of other information-processing considerations 
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such as compatibility effects, anchoring processes, and choice 
heuristics (Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1982). Whatever the 
causes, the fact that subtle differences in how risks are presented can 
have such marked effects suggests that those responsible for information 
programs have considerable ability to manipulate percept~ons and 
behavior. Indeed, since these effects are not widely known, people may 
inadyertently be manipulating their own perceptions by casual decisions 
that they make about how to organize their knowledge. 
Behavioral research can make a number of contributions toward the 
process of informing people about risk. Research can alert people to 
potential biases so that the parties involved can defend their own 
interests. It can also assess the feasibility of informational programs 
by determining how well people can be informed. Fortunately, despite 
the difficulties that have been discovered, there is evidence showing 
that properly designed information programs can be beneficial. Research 
indicates that people can understand some aspects of risk quite well and 
they do learn from experience. In situations where misperception of 
risks is widespread, people's errors can often be traced to inadequate 
information and biased experiences, which educational programs may be 
able to counter. A final contribution of research is in determining how 
interested people are in having the information at all. Despite 
occasional claims to the contrary by creators of risk, people seem to 
want information (Fischhoff, 1983; Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, 
1980a), even when the nature of that information is threatening 
(Weinstein, 1979; 1985). 
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Comparing Risks 
One common approach to deepening people's perspectives is presenting 
quantified risk estimates for a variety of hazards. These presentations 
typically involve elaborate tables and even 'catalogues of risks' in 
which diverse indices of death or disability are displayed for a broad 
spectrum of life's hazards. Some of these provide extensive data on 
risks per hour of exposure, showing, for example, that an hour of riding 
a motorcycle is as risky as an hour of being 75 years old. One analyst 
developed lists of activities, each of which is estimated to increase 
one's chances of death (in any year) by 1 in 106 • Other analysts have 
ranked hazards in terms of their expected reduction in life expectancy. 
Those who compile such data typically assume that they will be useful 
for decision making. 
The research on perceived risk described earlier implies that 
comparisons such as these will not, by themselves, be adequate guides to 
personal or public decision policies. Risk perceptions and risk-taking 
.behaviors appear to be determined not only by accident probabilities, 
annual mortality rates or the mean losses of life expectancy, but also 
by numerous other characteristics of hazards such as uncertainty, 
controllabtlity, catastrophic potential, equity and threat to future 
generations. ~ithin the perceptual space defined by these and other 
characteristics, each hazard is unique. To many persons, statements 
such as 'the annual risk from living near a nuclear power plant is. 
equivalent to the risk of riding an extra three miles in an automobile' 
appear ludicrous because they fail to give adequate consideration to the 
important differences in the nature of the risks from these two 
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technologies. However, comparisons within the same hazard domain, may 
be useful. For example, one may gain some perspective on the amount of 
radiation absorbed from a medical X ray by comparing it to radiation 
received in a trans-continental flight or from living in Denver for a 
year. Unfortunately, we need considerably more research to determine 
how best to compare risks and how to present risk statistics. 
Recognizing the Difficulties 
The development of programs to inform patients, workers and 
consumers about risk is an admirable goal. However, as the discussion 
above indicates, it is important to recognize the difficulties 
confronting such programs. Since every decision about the content and 
format of an information statement is. likely to influence perception and 
behavior (and ultimately product viability, jobs, electricity costs, 
compliance wi.th medical treatments, and other important consequences),· 
extreme care must be taken to select knowledgeable and trustworthy 
designers and program coordinators. Finally, it is important to 
recognize that informing peopie, whether by warning labels, package 
) 
inserts or extensive media presentations, is but part of the larger 
problem of helping them to cope with the risks and uncertainties of 
modern life. We believe that much of the responsibility lies with the 
schools, whose curricula should include material designed to teach 
people that the world in which they live is probabilistic, not 
deterministic, and to help them learn judgment and decision strategies 
for dealing with that world. These strategies are as necessary for 
navigating in a world of uncertain information as geometry and 
trigonometry are to nagivating among physical objects. 
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Table 1. Example of a payoff matrix 
State of nature 
sun (E 1 ) rain (E2) 
(+1) (+l) 
stay dry stay dry 
Al carry umbrella carrying carrying 
umbrella umbrella 
Alternatives 
(+2) (0) 
dry and wet and 
A2 leave umbrella unbur- unbur-
dened dened 
( 
Table 2 
Ordering of Perceived Risk for 30 Activities and Technologies 
(The ordering is based on the geometric mean risk ratings within each group. 
Rank 1 represents the most risky activity or technology.) 
Nuclear power 
Motor vehicles 
Handguns 
Smoking 
Motorcycles 
Alcoholic beverages 
General (privater av~atlon 
Police work 
Pesticides 
Surgery 
Fire fighting 
Large construction 
Hunting 
Spray cans 
Mountain climbing 
Bicycles 
Cotll)llercial aviation 
Electric power (non-nuclear) 
Swimming 
Contraceptives 
Skiing 
X rays 
High school & college football 
Railroads 
Food preservatives 
Food coloring 
Power mowers 
Prescription antibiotics 
Home appliances 
Vaccinations 
League of 
Women Voters 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
College 
Students 
1 
5 
2 
3 
6 
7 
15 
8 
4 
11 
10 
14 
18 
13 
22 
24 
16 
19 
30 
9 
25 
17 
26 
23 
12 
20 
28 
21 
27 
29 
Source: Slovic, Fischhoff, and Lichten,tein, 1981. 
Active Club 
Members · experts 
8 
3 
1 
4 
2 
5 
11 
7 
15 
9 
6 
13 
10 
23 
12 
14 
18 
19 
17 
22 
16 
24 
21 
20 
28 
30 
25 
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A civil defense committee in a large metropolitan area met 
recently to discuss contingency plans in the event of various 
emergencies. One emergency threat under discussion posed two 
options, both involving some loss of life . 
. Option A: Carries with it a .5 probability of containing the 
threat with a loss of 40 lives and a .5 probability of losing 
60 lives. It is like taking the gamble: 
.5 lose 40 lives 
.. 5 lose 60 lives 
Option B: Would result in the loss of 50 lives: 
lose 50 lives 
The options can be presented under three different frames: 
I. This is a choice between a 50-50 gamble (lose 40 or lose 
60 lives) and a sure thing (the loss of 50 lives). 
II. Whatever is done at least 40 lives will be lost. This 
is a choice between a gamble with a 50-50 chance of either losing 
no additional lives or losing 20 additional lives (A) and the sure 
loss of 10 additional lives (B). 
III. Option B produces a loss of 50 lives. Taking Option A 
would mean accepting a gamble with a ,5 chance to save 10 lives 
and a .5 chance to lose 10 additional lives. 
Figure 2. Decision framing: Three perspectives on a civil 
defense problem. 
Source: Fischhoff, 1983 (a). 
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Figure 3. Judgments of perceived risk for experts (top) and laypeople 
{bottom) plotted against the best technical estima~es of annual fatalities 
for 25 technologies and activities. Each point represents the average. 
responses of the participants. The dashed lines are the straight lines 
that best fit the points. The experts' risk judgments are seen to be more 
closely associated with annual fatality rates than are the lay judgments. 
Source: Slavic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein, 1979. 
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Figure 4.· Hazard locations on Factors 1 and 2 of the three-dimensional 
structure derived from the interrelationships among 18 risk characteristics. 
Factor 3 (not shown) reflects the number of people exposed to the hazard 
and the degree of one's personal exposure. The diagram beneath the 
figure illustrates the characteristics that comprise the two factors. 
Source: Slovic., Fischhoff, and Lichtenstein, in press. 
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Figure 5. Attitudes towards regulation of the hazards in Figure 4. 
The larger the point, the greater the desire for strict regulation 
to reduce risk. 
Source: Slovic, Lichtenstein and Fischhoff, in press. 
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Figure 6. Relation between signal potential and risk characterization 
for 30 hazards in Figure 4. The larger the point, the greater the 
degree to which an accident involving the hazard was judged to 
"serve as a warning signal for society, providing new information about 
the probability that similar or even more destructive mishaps might 
occure within this type of activity." 
Source: Slov.ic, Lichtenstein & Fischhoff, 1'984. 
